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Abstract
Background: Working in ad hoc teams in a health care environment is frequent but a challenging and complex
undertaking. One way for teams to refine their teamwork could be through post-resuscitation reflection and
debriefing. However, this would require that teams have insight into the quality of their teamwork. This study
investigates (1) the accuracy of the self-monitoring of ad hoc resuscitation teams and their leaders relative to
external observations of their teamwork and (2) the relationship of team self-monitoring and external observations
to objective performance measures.
Methods: We conducted a quantitative observational study of real-world ad hoc interprofessional teams responding to a
simulated cardiac arrest in an emergency room. Teams consisting of residents, consultants, and nurses were confronted
with an unexpected, simulated, standardized cardiac arrest situation. Their teamwork was videotaped to allow for
subsequent external evaluation on the team emergency assessment measure (TEAM) checklist. In addition, objective
performance measures such as time to defibrillation were collected. All participants completed a demographic
questionnaire prior to the simulation and a questionnaire tapping their perceptions of teamwork directly after it.
Results: 22 teams consisting of 115 health care professionals showed highly variable performance. All performance
measures intercorrelated significantly, with the exception of team leaders’ evaluations of teamwork, which were not
related to any other measures. Neither team size nor cumulative experience were correlated with any measures, but
teams led by younger leaders performed better than those led by older ones.
Conclusion: Team members seem to have better insight into their team’s teamwork than team leaders. As a practical
consequence, the decision to debrief and the debriefing itself after a resuscitation should be informed by team members,
not just leaders.
Keywords: Debriefing, Self-monitoring, Ad hoc teams, Resuscitation, Emergency medicine, Postgraduate education,
Interprofessional education
Background
Health care is an inherently social and interdisciplinary
endeavour [1, 2]. Take, for example, emergency depart-
ments, where teams of physicians, nurses, and other
health care professionals are routinely involved in
diagnosing and treating patients [1, 3–5]. Collaboration is
particularly common in high-urgency situations such as
trauma calls or resuscitations that are typically handled by
ad hoc teams (also known as health care action teams or
interdisciplinary action teams): interdisciplinary, interpro-
fessional groups of specialized individuals who work to-
gether in a highly dynamic, complex situation and under
time pressure to accomplish critical tasks [6].
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Especially when time is of the essence, the perform-
ance of such teams critically depends on the quality of
their teamwork [7, 8], a term that summarizes “human
factors and non-technical skills (leadership, [collabor-
ation], situation awareness and decision making)” [9].
For example, Tiel and colleagues demonstrated that pa-
tient mortality is lower when trauma teams are trained
in teamwork, including leadership skills [10]. One such
key skill is coordination [11] or, as Marks et al. put it,
“orchestrating the sequence and the timing of inter-
dependent actions” [12]. Teamwork in emergencies fur-
thermore should be contextually adaptive and account
for team member experience and patient acuity [13].
Obviously, developing such teamwork requires train-
ing and experience of team members. Plenty of publica-
tions describe simulations to address this need (e.g.,
[14–19]). A few common training aims, often referred to
as crew (or crisis) resource management principles
(CRM), are widely adopted [20]. This conception impli-
citly assumes that training CRM in one ad-hoc team
transfers to other ad-hoc teams, in which trainees may
find themselves in the next day. However, it remains un-
clear if that is indeed the case and whether and how the
skills acquired in such simulations translate to clinical
practice [21, 22]. Fortunately, clinical practice itself also
provides many opportunities for real-life ad hoc teams
to (further) refine their teamwork.
Several tools have been developed to guide feedback to
resuscitation teams by scaffolding outside observations
(e.g., [9, 23–26]). Post-resuscitation debriefing, for ex-
ample, is recommended by resuscitation guidelines inter-
nationally [27, 28] to facilitate reflection upon teamwork
as it has been associated with important patient out-
comes such as return of spontaneous circulation and
shorter no-flow time in cardiopulmonary resuscitation.
The use of these tools requires, however, the presence of
a trained observer, which poses both logistical and eth-
ical challenges [29]. Because ad hoc teams, particularly
in emergency care, can be needed at any time of any
day, it is rarely feasible to ensure an observer’s availabil-
ity. In addition, it may be ethically unacceptable to limit
the outside expert’s role to observation if the team’s per-
formance is less than optimal. Yet, prompt intervention
would disturb both the team and the collection of infor-
mation for later debriefing.
One potential way to inform debriefing that circumvents
the logistical and ethical challenges is self-reflection of the
team. Several frameworks for post-resuscitation debriefing
exploit that possibility in that they ask the team to reflect
on “what went well” and “what could have gone better”,
for example [30]. Almost all emergency rooms (ERs) es-
tablish the role of a physician team leader in their resusci-
tation teams. Because most post-resuscitation debriefing
frameworks call upon the physician team leader or the
charge nurse to decide whether a debrief is required at all
(e.g. [30]), the accuracy of their self-evaluation is of critical
importance.
But are teams and their leaders accurate judges of their
own teamwork? The literature on self-monitoring suggests
so [31–33]: Although it has repeatedly been demonstrated
that individuals’ self-assessments are low in accuracy [34, 35],
people are much better able to self-monitor their current
performance [31–33]. The key conceptual difference be-
tween self-assessment and self-monitoring is the timing of
introspection: self-assessment refers to a summative overall
self-evaluation detached from a single event (e.g., “How
good a team player am I?”), whereas self-monitoring is a
moment-to-moment assessment of one’s performance in a
given situation (e.g., “How is our teamwork in this particular
case?”) [35]. Self-monitoring is what prompts people to
“slow down when they should” [33] or to look up a word
when they are unsure of its meaning [35]. Self-reflection of
team members before debriefing within a team directly after
attending to a patient is conceptually closer to self-
monitoring than to self-assessment, because the reflection
refers to a single event in close temporal proximity, not an
overall and aggregate judgement.
Based on this conception of self-monitoring, we
hypothesize that the ability of both teams and their
physician team leaders to self-monitor their teamwork
directly after attending to a patient will be comparable
to that of an external observer. Such an ability would
justify relying on team members’ self-monitoring to in-
form debriefing in real-life teams, thus easing and facili-
tating training on the job.
Furthermore, we investigated whether the ratings of
teamwork provided by the team, their leader and exter-
nal observers are related to objective measures of per-
formance that directly affect patient outcomes [36]. It is
arguably only clinically meaningful and defensible to as-
sess how well teams and their physician team leaders
self-monitor their teamwork relative to an external ob-
server if either the team’s self-monitoring judgements or
the external observations are related to direct patient
outcomes or measures of proven importance.
This quantitative observational study therefore ad-
dressed the following research questions:
1) How accurately do ad hoc resuscitation teams and
their leaders monitor their teamwork relative to
external observers’ rating of that teamwork?
2) How do teams’ self-monitoring judgements and ex-
ternal observations of their teamwork relate to ob-
jective performance measures?
Methods
We conducted an observational study of real-world in-
terprofessional ad hoc teams responding to a simulated
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cardiac arrest in the emergency room. Teams consisting
of residents, consultants, and nurses were confronted
with an unexpected, simulated, standardized cardiac ar-
rest situation. Their performance was videotaped to
allow for subsequent external evaluation.
Participants, teams, and setting
The study was conducted in a single university-affiliated
level-one emergency room attending to more than
50.000 patients annually [37]. All medical staff in this
emergency room are required to attend an interprofes-
sional training day once annually. Staff were assigned to
one of 10 training days in their work schedule; participa-
tion in these trainings is mandatory. On each training
day, participants were randomly assigned to one of four
teams. Randomization was stratified by profession, so
that each team included at least one physician and two
nurses. Depending on training day attendance, some
teams were larger than others, including up to three
physicians and up to four nurses, reflecting team vari-
ability in clinical practice. The most senior physician in
each team was appointed physician team leader upon
team formation, reflecting clinical practice in the emer-
gency room under investigation. We did not provide fur-
ther instructions to physician team leaders because all
participating physicians regularly fulfil this role in clin-
ical practice, and we did not expect any differences be-
tween that role in the simulation and clinical practice.
Simulation and scenario
The 2019 interprofessional training day was designed as
a rotation through different skill stations, where partici-
pants trained techniques such as intraosseous access, pa-
tient positioning, and paediatric advanced life support.
Further, all teams rotated to a simulated shift handover,
which was unexpectedly interrupted by a resuscitation
call. Teams attended to this call as they would in reality;
the simulation was designed as an in situ simulation and
took place in the actual resuscitation bay of the emer-
gency room.
In this resuscitation bay, teams were confronted with
an elderly male patient on a stretcher (represented by a
Leardal SimMan Essential patient simulator) under on-
going cardiopulmonary resuscitation (CPR) by para-
medics. The paramedics reported to have initially
encountered a conscious but helpless elderly patient in his
flat. There, the patient was found lying on the floor after
tripping over the sill of his balcony door 10 h previously
when coming back inside from his balcony. He had fallen
from body height and had been unable to alert help for an
extended period up until a neighbour heard his calls for
help. The paramedics found a hemodynamically stable,
cold, and conscious but disoriented patient. They estab-
lished a venous access and transferred the patient to the
hospital uneventfully. Upon transfer from the ambulance
onto the hospital’s stretcher just minutes prior, the patient
had gone into cardiac arrest. The paramedics started CPR
and alerted the ER staff.
The paramedics repeatedly informed the attending ER
team that the patient’s flat was cold due to the balcony
door being open and that the patient was cold as well.
Paramedics had just initiated basic life support. Neither
medication nor defibrillation had yet been provided. The
paramedics then handed over resuscitation to the ERs
team but remained available for further questions while
they reorganized their material.
The patient simulator was programmed to exhibit a
ventricular fibrillation and not to respond to resuscita-
tive measures for the next 15 min. The team worked in
its familiar emergency room environment with its usual
equipment. Whenever a team member providing chest
compressions was replaced, a study aid quietly informed
them that their hands felt very cold due to the patient’s
cold chest. This was necessary because the simulator
used could not be programmed to feel cold. Whenever a
team decided to take the patient’s temperature, the
thermometer read 27.3 °C independent of the location of
temperature measurement. All phone calls made by the
team were answered by the simulation instructors, who
responded with a standard response indicating that they
would be available within a few minutes.
The simulation was wound up as soon as teams called
for extracorporeal circulation (ECC) due to hypothermic
arrest or ended by the instructor if teams had clearly
made a different diagnosis of why the patient was in ar-
rest. The whole scenario was intended to last less than
15min. It was followed by a structured, instructor-led
debriefing that included reviewing a video recording of
the simulation. The debriefing was led by a trained and
experienced simulation instructor and revolved around
teamwork, team leadership and non-technical skills.
Ethics
The ethics committee of the Canton of Bern deemed the
study to be exempt from full ethical review (Req-2017-
00968) because it did not involve patients. All partici-
pants provided written informed consent for their data
to be used in the study. As an incentive, all participants
were entered in a lottery for the chance to win one of
two tablet computers.
Measurement instruments
Participant questionnaires
All participants in the study independently answered two
custom questionnaires. The first, which was administered
prior to the simulation scenario, collected demographic
information, data on participants’ professional experience,
and information on their degree of acquaintance with the
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other team members. The data were collected as
numbers (age, experience), through checkboxes (gen-
der), or on 5-point Likert scales (acquaintance). The
second questionnaire was completed individually dir-
ectly after the simulation scenario and before debrief-
ing. It assessed participants’ familiarity with the task
(“Please indicate how familiar you are with cases like the
one you just encountered.”) and their self-monitoring of
their team’s teamwork (“Please indicate your confidence
in the quality of your team’s teamwork.”) on 5-point Likert
scales. It is generally assumed that the resulting confi-
dence scores reflect the metacognitive feeling of fluency
(see e.g., [38]). Previous research has shown a close rela-
tion of such confidence scores to other indicators of flu-
ency, such as response time on diagnostic tasks [39] and
the likelihood to change an initial answer in multiple
choice tests [40].
Video recordings and choice of rating tool
All simulations were video recorded and recordings were
evaluated by independent external expert raters, one
psychologist (JF) and one emergency physician (WEH),
both with extensive simulation experience. Their ratings
were recorded using the Team Emergency Assessment
Measure (TEAM) checklist [9]. In contrast to many
other tools assessing teamwork (for a review, see [41]),
TEAM has good psychometric properties such as a high
interrater-reliability and high inter-item correlations, has
been validated in several translated versions, and used in
a variety of simulated and real-life resuscitation scenar-
ios (for a review see [29]). In this study, we employed
the German translation of the instrument [29].
The TEAM checklist is a previously published instru-
ment that consists of 11 items assessing teamwork of
medical emergency teams on 3 subscales: leadership (2
items), teamwork (7 items), and task management (2
items). All items are rated on a Likert scale ranging from
0 (never/hardly ever) to 4 (always/nearly always) and
are then summarized into a sum score ranging between
0 and 44. In addition, teamwork is rated on a global rat-
ing scale (GRS) ranging from 1 (worst possible perform-
ance) to 10 (best possible performance). The GRS was
worded as “Please provide an overall evaluation of the
non-medical performance of this team.” Because a previ-
ous factor analysis [36] identified one underlying compo-
nent accounting for 81% of the observed variation, with
factor loadings > 0.6 and Eigenvalues > 1, it is defensible
and common practice to summarize items of the TEAM
into a sum score in the range between 0 and 44. The
two expert raters each assessed 20% of the videos inde-
pendently and in duplicate. As inter-rater agreement was
good to excellent (intraclass correlation coefficient ICC =
0.87), the remaining videos were rated by a single rater.
We further extracted objective performance measures
from the videos. In patients under resuscitation, such
measures include early defibrillation and timing and
number of doses of adrenaline administered [42], and
implementation of extracorporeal circulation (ECC) in
hypothermic cardiac arrest [43] and will be referred to
as performance hereafter.
Data management and analysis
Questionnaire data were recorded on paper and entered
into an excel sheet by an administrative assistant. 20% of
the data entered were randomly selected and cross-
checked by one of the authors (SCH). Videos were re-
corded using the AV system permanently installed in the
resuscitation bay and stored on a secure network storage
drive institutionally approved for storage of health re-
lated personal information. Video ratings and the
extracted performance data such as time to first defibril-
lation were directly entered into a spreadsheet by expert
raters. All data collected were then imported into an
SPSS file. SPSS version 25 (IBM cooperation) was used
for data analysis. Data are described using mean or me-
dian and standard deviation or range, as appropriate.
We calculated Pearson’s correlations between the rater-
based measures of teamwork (TEAM sum score and
GRS) and participants’ self-evaluation of teamwork. We
also correlated the rater-based measures of teamwork
with team characteristics such as size, cumulative experi-
ence, and age of the team leader. Last, we assessed the
relationship between TEAM sum scores or GRS and
other behavioural data, such as time to first defibrilla-
tion. P values of less than 0.05 are considered significant.
Results
A total of 26 teams participated in the study. Two teams
were excluded from the analysis because the videos were
not recorded due to a technical failure. One team was
excluded because two of its participants did not consent
to study participation, and one team because the team
contained a physician involved in this study. The ana-
lysis was thus based on 22 teams consisting of 115
health care professionals (22 physician team leaders and
93 team members). Participants were on average 36.7
years old and had a mean of 13.1 years’ professional ex-
perience, 6.3 years of those in emergency medicine;
77.4% were female (Table 1). Team leaders were on
average 36.4 years old and had a mean of 9 years’ profes-
sional experience, 3.4 years of those in emergency medi-
cine; 77.3% were female. Each team contained at least
one physician (range 1–3, median 1) and two nurses
(range 2–4, median 3); no team was smaller than 3 per-
sons (range 3–6, median 4).
The objectively observable performance of the teams
was highly variable: On average, it took 8 min and 15 s
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(SD = 1:05min) before teams called for ECC due to
hypothermic arrest (n = 9) or the instructor ended the
simulation (n = 13). Although all teams correctly recog-
nized an arrest requiring early defibrillation, only half (n =
11) limited the number of attempted defibrillations, as is
best practice in cases of hypothermic arrest. Time to defib-
rillation (mean = 1:06min) and time to first adrenaline
(mean = 3:31min) was also highly variable across teams
(Table 1). Two teams failed to administer adrenaline at all.
Teamwork quality as reflected by the external observa-
tions also varied greatly (Table 1). The TEAM sum score
and the GRS were strongly correlated (rTEAM-GRS = 0.92,
p < 0.001). Those teams with the highest scores on both
scales were also the quickest to defibrillate and to pro-
vide adrenaline to the patient, providing further evidence
for the concurrent validity of the TEAM measurement
instrument (Table 2).
Team members’ self-monitoring judgements of their
team’s teamwork were strongly correlated with both
of the measures based on external observations
(rTEAM_members-self = 0.573, p < 0.001, rGRS_members-self =
0.628, p < 0.001; Table 3). Interestingly, the same did
not apply to the team leaders’ self-monitoring of their
team’s teamwork (rTEAM_leader-self = 0.347, p = 0.145,
rGRS_leader-self = 0.451, p = 0.052; Table 4).
Neither team size, nor number of physicians per
team, nor cumulative or average experience within a
team was associated with the external observations.
However, teams led by younger physicians achieved
better teamwork scores from external observers than
those led by older physicians (rTEAM_leader-age = −
0.461, p = 0.047, rGRS_leader-age = − 0.473, p = 0.041;
Table 4).
Table 1 Descriptive statistics
Mean Standard deviation Min Max
Participants overall
Age [years] 36.7 10.3 20 63
Professional experience [years] 12.7 9.7 0.4 39
Experience emergency medicine [years] 6.3 7.5 0.2 36
Gender 77.4% female
Team leader
Age [years] 36.4 8.3 29 61
Professional experience [years] 9.0 8.6 2 37
Experience emergency medicine [years] 3.4 5.8 1 27
Gender 77.3% female
Scenarios and Performance
Total duration [min:sec] 8:15 1:05 5:45 10:15
Time to defibrillation [min:sec] 1:06 0:42 0:09 2:32
Time to adrenaline [min:sec] 3:31 1:34 0:50 6:47a
TEAM GRS score [points out of 10] 6.4 1.8 3 10
TEAM sum score [points out of 44] 31.8 5.5 21 42
a Two teams did not administer adrenaline at all.
Table 2 Correlations of external observations, team characteristics and performance
external observations team characteristics performance
TEAM GRS Score TEAM sum score team size number of physicians number of nurses time to
defibrillation
time to
adrenaline
TEAM GRS Score 1 0.943** 0.055 −0.072 0.116 −.463** −.217*
TEAM sum score .943** 1 0.061 −0.070 0.120 −.451** −.226*
team size 0.055 0.061 1 .421** .627** −0.048 −0.093
number of physicians −0.072 −0.070 .421** 1 −.443** 0.193 0.202
number of nurses 0.116 0.120 .627** −.443** 1 −.214* −.284**
time to defibrillation −.463** −.451** −0.048 0.193 −.214* 1 .486**
time to adrenaline −.217* −.226* − 0.093 0.202 −.284** .486** 1
*. Significant on a 0.05 level (two-sided); **. Significant on a 0.01 level (two-sided)
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Discussion
The performance of teams in this observational study of
leadership in ad hoc teams attending to a simulated car-
diac arrest with a rare cause varied greatly, with less than
half of all teams making the correct diagnosis and calling
for ECC. This variation should not be interpreted as a
threat to the quality of actual care, because the whole
idea of simulation-based training is to move participants
out of their comfort zone to stimulate learning [44]. In
fact, the rationale behind training for a hypothermic car-
diac arrest was that this algorithm differs in important
respects (e.g., dosing of adrenaline; frequency of defibril-
lation; early initiation of ECC) from standard advanced
cardiac life support [43], and hypothermic arrests occur
regularly (although infrequently) in our catchment area
[37, 45, 46]. The scenario thus tested the team leader’s
ability to lead the team through an algorithm that differs
substantially from the much more common standard ad-
vanced cardiac life support [47], thus offering a potent
opportunity for learning.
This heterogeneity in objective performance across
teams is reflected in both, the external observation mea-
sures of video recordings and the teams’ self-monitoring,
a finding that directly answers our second research ques-
tion. The fact that objective performance measures of re-
suscitations correlate with scores on the TEAM checklist
further validates this instrument for the assessment of re-
suscitation teams, a finding in line with previous research
[9, 36]. It is interesting to note that the TEAM instrument
assesses quality of teamwork, not quality of a resuscitation
per se, but it seems that good teamwork is a prerequisite
for good resuscitation [9, 36]. This finding, which we
replicate, is reassuring, because arguably, the sole purpose
of attending to patients in cardiac arrest with a team is to
provide good resuscitation.
With regard to the first research question, we found
moderately high agreement between the external obser-
vations and team members’ self-monitoring of their
teams’ teamwork. These findings are well in line with
the literature on self-monitoring of one’s individual per-
formance on a moment-by-moment basis [31, 35, 39, 40,
48]. Our study extends this conception in two important
ways. First, it indicates that the ability to accurately self-
evaluate applies to both concurrent monitoring during
an event and the time shortly after this event has con-
cluded. Second, it suggests that individuals are capable
of monitoring not only their own performance but also
that of a team to which they belong. Interestingly, this
finding does not hold for team leaders evaluating their
team’s teamwork.
There are two possible explanations for the latter find-
ing. One is that evaluating a team’s teamwork as a team
member is a substantially different task than evaluating
this team’s teamwork as the team leader. Every physician
team leader carries the responsibility for their team’s
teamwork, because arguably a key purpose of instituting
a physician team leader is to ensure good teamwork in
ad-hoc teams. Given the complexity of leadership [3, 10,
12, 13, 49], particularly in highly dynamic environments
such as emergency rooms, leaders may be operating at
their full capacity and lack the necessary mental re-
sources for additional meta-cognitive tasks such as self-
monitoring. The diffusion of responsibility observable
even in small groups [50, 51] may also lead to this
Table 3 Correlations between self-monitoring, member characteristics and external observations
Self-monitoring member characteristics external observations
Age ER experience TEAM GRS Score TEAM sum score
Self-monitoring 1 0.095 0.046 0.628** 0.573**
Age 0.095 1 .763** −0.175 −0.140
ER experience 0.046 .763** 1 −0.162 −0.130
TEAM GRS Score 0.628** −0.175 −0.162 1 .944**
TEAM sum score 0.573** −0.140 −0.130 .944** 1
*. Significant on a 0.05 level (two-sided); **. Significant on a 0.01 level (two-sided)
Table 4 Correlations between self-monitoring, leader characteristics and external observations
Self-monitoring leader characteristics external observations
Age ER experience TEAM GRS Score TEAM sum score
Self-monitoring 1 0.651** 0.32 0.451 0.347
Age 0.651** 1 0.660** −0.473* −0.461*
ER experience 0.320 0.660** 1 −0.163 −0.242
TEAM GRS Score 0.451 −0.473* −0.163 1 0.945**
TEAM sum score 0.347 −0.461* −0.242 0.945** 1
*. Significant on a 0.05 level (two-sided); **. Significant on a 0.01 level (two-sided)
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diffused responsibility being burdened on the team
leader when teams institute such a function explicitly,
resulting in further leader overload. It remains an open
question whether this phenomenon also affects teams
led by experienced non-physicians such as advanced
practice nurses. Such nurses may be less tempted than
physicians to focus on things other than teamwork in
their role as team leaders. Also, nurses in emergency
medicine often have considerably longer experience in
the field than the physicians they work with. In this
study, for example, team members (i.e., mostly nurses)
had about twice as much experience in emergency medi-
cine as physician team leaders. Although we cannot ex-
clude that professional experience plays a role in the
ability to self-monitor oneself, the literature on self-
monitoring suggests otherwise (e.g. [39, 40]).
Another reason for that we did not observe adequate
self-monitoring in team leaders may simply be the small
sample size of just 22 team leaders. This sample may be
too small to achieve significance when testing the likeli-
hood of a correlation occurring by chance. However, we
did find significant correlations between team perform-
ance and leaders’ age at this sample size. Sample size re-
mains a notorious challenge in small group research [2],
and this study is no exception.
Other limitations of this study result from its observa-
tional design, which was chosen to mimic real-world cir-
cumstances as closely as possible, but which rendered it
impossible to control for and/or manipulate variables
that may affect performance, such as team size, struc-
ture, or heterogeneity [52]. This limitation is, at the
same time, one of the key strengths of the study: real-
world ad hoc teams are also diverse with respect to all
these variables and change on a frequent basis. The only
such variable we found to affect teamwork was the age
of the team leader. We can only speculate that this is be-
cause younger team leaders may have more recently re-
ceived training on resuscitation guidelines, but this
finding requires closer investigation. In addition, other
factors that may affect teamwork such as institutional
culture and environment were not varied between teams
in this study, potentially limiting generalizability of our
findings to environments substantially different from the
one investigated here. Last, the simulation is limited by
the fact that a hint was necessary to tell participants that
their hands went cold during chest compression, because
the simulator used cannot be programmed to feel cold.
Conclusion
Team members seem to have better insight into their
teams’ teamwork than team leaders, as indicated by the
moderately high correlation of their self-monitoring rat-
ings with external ratings of their teamwork. As a prac-
tical consequence, the decision to debrief after a
resuscitation and the debriefing itself should be informed
by team members, not just leaders. External ratings of
teamwork as recorded with the TEAM instrument were
substantially correlated to objective measures of team per-
formance, a finding that further adds to the validity of the
TEAM assessment instrument.
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